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I. INTRODUCTION
In the international arena, plaintiffs rely on doctrines of
international state responsibility to bring tort actions, making pri-
vate parties responsible for violations committed by states. The
analog of such jurisprudence in the United States is the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (ATCA).
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress established federal
jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by individuals in
violation of the law of nations. ATCA was created as the civil
counterpart to those criminal provisions. "Where an alien is
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injured by the commission of a tort in a violation of the law of
nations or a treaty, ATCA recognizes the legal personality and
duty of the tortfeasor to compensate the injured alien."1
However, recent decisions interpreting ATCA have come
under heavy criticism. Three specific areas of ATCA present the
most problems. The first is the difficulty in determining whether
the specific wrong complained of is actionable, the second is deter-
mining when a private party can be sued in the absence of state
action, and the third is the difficulty in determining which sub-
stantive tests should be applied to the defendants' conduct. This
Comment focuses on the last of these problems. Because most vio-
lations are so egregious, courts are less hesitant to find condemna-
tion of such acts in the appropriate sources of controlling law.
However, when choosing the appropriate tests, it is much harder
to implement the logic of 'ends justifying means,' and courts have
greatly diverged on whether domestic substantive law or specific
international standards are appropriate for determining liability.
This Comment focuses on why using domestic jurisprudence is
extremely problematic and why courts should universally incorpo-
rate specific international standards into ATCA jurisprudence.
Part II presents a brief overview of ATCA as presently inter-
preted. In that section, John Doe I v. Unocal Corp.2 is introduced.
This case is at the forefront of the issues discussed in this Com-
ment. The Unocal decision was the first to hold that liability
under ATCA may be appropriately determined according to spe-
cific international substantive tests. Focus will be on this case in
light of the Ninth Circuit's February 14, 2003 order to rehear the
case en bane.3
In Part III, problems and inconsistencies with the statute are
acknowledged and discussed, and sources of international law
ready for incorporation are identified. Part IV lays out the argu-
ments from both parties' petitions for rehearing of John Doe I v.
1. Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute and a
Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473, 498-99 (1986). Congress deemed
ATCA particularly necessary because "[tihere is no global international tribunal to
resolve [cases of human rights violations against aliens], and [these] victims generally
cannot get a fair hearing in their home countries. . . ." RALPH G. STEINHARDT &
ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMs ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 45
(2001).
2. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter
Unocal Appeal Decision].
3. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Unocal Rehearing Order].
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Unocal Corp.' Part V analyzes why such standards ought be
incorporated into ATCA jurisprudence, and the Comment con-
cludes in Part VI. It must be noted that Part V is an adventure
into relatively virgin territory, as this analysis has not been
explored in the multitude of literature investigating ATCA. Ulti-
mately, this Comment seeks to demonstrate that specific tests for
complicity derived from sources of international law will promote
clarity and consistency in ATCA jurisprudence and ought to be
incorporated into the Act.
II. ATCA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. Legislative History
The Alien Tort Claims Act, reads, "[tihe district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."'
In an attempt to punish violations of the law of nations Con-
gress, in 1789, meant to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction
over the crimes of piracy, slave trading, and kidnapping of ambas-
sadors.' Congress' enactment of ATCA grew from an accepted con-
demnation for such acts and those committing them, "viewing
these offenders as hostis humani generis, or 'enemies of all man-
kind'. . . ." This extraterritorial jurisdiction was an "exception to
the normal dictate that international law does not permit . . .
jurisdiction for unofficial acts."'
Because the law of nations itself does not provide rights of
action, the inference is that Congress sought to grant causes of
action to foreign nationals for violations thereof. "Any other inter-
pretation would render ATCA valueless ....
4. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra note 2.
5. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
6. Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11
B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1993). For more insight into Congress' intent, see Jeffrey M.
Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J.
53 (1970).
7. Simon, supra note 6, at 9.
8. Id.
9. Andrew Ridenour, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Apples and Oranges: Why Courts
Should Use International Standards to Determine Liability for Violation of the Law of
Nations Under the Alie Tort Claims Act, 9 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 581, 584 (2001).
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B. Case Law
"The modern interpretation of [ATCA] began with Filartiga°
v. Pena-Irala."" Filartiga states, "[ATCA] provides both jurisdic-
tion for district courts and a cause of action for violations of the
law of nations.' 2
The plaintiffs in Filartiga were citizens of Paraguay, where
Dr. Filartiga was an opponent of Paraguay's ruling party. He sent
his daughter, Dolly, to the U.S. in 1978 under a visitor's visa, and
Dolly subsequently applied for permanent political asylum."3
Dr. Filartiga also had a seventeen-year-old son, Joelito, who
was allegedly kidnapped and tortured to death by Americo
Norberto Pena-Irala (Pena), the then Inspector General of Police
in Paraguay. The Filartigas claim Joelito was tortured and killed
because of Dr. Filartiga's political opposition."
In 1978, Pena entered the U.S. and began living in Brooklyn,
New York.'5 Dolly, who was living in Washington, D.C. learned
Pena was in the country, and, using that information, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization service arrested him. He was subse-
quently ordered deported. 16
Immediately, Dolly served Pena with a summons and civil
complaint alleging that Pena wrongfully caused Joelito's death
and sought damages of $10,000,000.'" The Filartigas claimed
jurisdiction under ATCA, arguing that Pena's alleged torture of
Joelito violated the law of nations.'8 The District Court for the
Eastern District of New York disagreed and, construing the law of
nations narrowly, dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 9 Pena then returned to Paraguay."
The Filartigas appealed, arguing that torture is in fact a vio-
lation of the law of nations, and the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit agreed. Addressing the question of whether torture is
a violation of the law of nations, the court stated, "In light of the
universal condemnation of torture... , we find that an act of tor-
10. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. Ridenour, supra note 9, at 583.
12. Id. at 584.
13. Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 878.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 878-79.
16. Id. at 879.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 880.
20. Id.
518
20031 SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
ture committed by a state official... violates established norms of
the international law of human rights, and hence the law of
nations."2
Even though the court found that "there are few, if any, issues
in international law ... on which opinion seems to be so united as
the limitations on a state's power to torture persons,"22 the court
acknowledged that a "requirement that a rule command the 'gen-
eral assent of civilized nations' to become binding upon them all is
a stringent one. Were this not so, the courts of one nation might
feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the
name of applying international law."23 So, according to Filartiga,
there is no unanimity requirement for a violation to fall within the
law of nations. In fact, "the ultimate scope of those rights [falling
within the law of nations is] a subject for continuing refinement
and elaboration....
However, Filartiga did not leave completely open the question
of determining which violations are actionable. "The Supreme
Court has enumerated the appropriate sources of international
law. The law of nations 'may be ascertained by consulting the
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the gen-
eral usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recog-
nizing and enforcing that law."'25 Left open, however, was the
question of whether ATCA applied to private individuals as well
as state actors.
In general, though, to state a claim under ATCA, a plaintiff
must allege: 1) a claim by an alien, 2) a tort, and 3) a violation of
either the law of nations or a treaty of the U.S.
26
Most recently, in John Doe I v. Unocal Corp. ,27 a three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals modified the approach
to ATCA in the context of reversing a summary judgment granted
in favor of the defendants. This decision was the first domestic
case to delineate specific international standards appropriate for
liability determinations in ATCA cases, and, as will be discussed
in section V, proves that such standards are a step in the right
21. Id.
22. Id. at 881.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 885. Note this is not the focus of the author's Comment and only merits
mentioning at this point as one of Filartiga's key holdings.
25. Id. at 880.
26. Ridenour, supra note 9, at 595; see also Simon, supra note 6, at 8-9.
27. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra, note 2. Because this Comment discusses three
different opinions in the Unocal matter, reference to the case name "Unocal" as used
hereafter refers to the 2002 decision by the three-judge panel.
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direction for meaningful changes in ATCA jurisprudence. The
Ninth Circuit, however, has just ordered that this case be reheard
en banc in June, 2003.2 This Comment was written in the hope
that the en banc panel affirms the Unocal decision in its entirety
and further seeks to explain why such a holding is necessary.
In Unocal, a group of fifteen Burmese villagers brought suit
against California-based oil companies for international human
rights violations. The defendants are collectively referred to as
"Unocal."29 Plaintiffs claimed Unocal entered into a joint venture
with a French oil company and the government of Myanmar (the
Burmese military) to extract natural gas from the coast of
Burma. ° Plaintiffs further claimed that Unocal, as a private
party, was responsible for human rights violations committed by
the Burmese military in furtherance of construction of a gas pipe-
line.3 The plaintiffs alleged that during the construction of the
pipeline the military forced the villagers, under threats of vio-
lence, to work on the projects and to relocate for the benefit of the
project. Plaintiffs also alleged specific acts of violence including,
torture, rape, and murder.2
The parties stipulated that the third prong of the ATCA test,
the existance of a violation of either the law of nations or a treaty
of the U.S., was satisfied,3 3 but disagreed as to whether, under dif-
fering tests of substantive law, Unocal could be liable for these
violations.
Plaintiffs put forth two arguments for Unocal's liability: (1)
liability as a private actor, and (2) liability under a color of law/
joint action doctrine. Nevertheless, the District Court granted
defendant Unocal's motions for summary judgment on all of plain-
tiffs ATCA claims.' The District Court also granted Unocal's
motion to recover costs in the amount of $125,846.07. 35 Plaintiffs
subsequently appealed the foregoing judgments.
28. Unocal Rehearing Order, supra, note 3. "Upon the vote of a majority of non-
recused regular active judges of this court, it is ordered that this case be reheard by
the en banc court pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3. The three-judge panel opinion shall
not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit,
except to the extent adopted by the en banc court." Id. at *1.
29. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1295 (C.D. Ca. 2000)
[hereinafter Unocal District Court Opinion].
30. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra note 2, at *1.
31. Id. at *3.
32. Id. at *3-*4.
33. See supra text accompanying note 26. Hence, whether the alleged acts
violated the law of nations was not at issue.
34. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra note 2, at *7.
35. Id. at *8.
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1. Liability for Private, Non-State Actors36
Recently, "in a series of cases involving 'proto-states' and
paramilitary groups. . . courts [have come] to interpret [ATCA] in
conformity with emerging international standards expanding lia-
bility to non-state actors."37 This expansion was motivated by a
concern that certain violations of human rights exist in the
absence of state action. For example, violations like torture, slave
trade, and piracy violate norms of international law in lieu of state
participation.
In Kadic v. Karadzic, s plaintiffs were Croat and Muslim citi-
zens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The defendant, Karadzic, was part of
a three-man presidency exercising actual control over the military
within large parts of Bosnia.39 Plaintiffs alleged they were victims
of crimes including rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation,
torture, and execution, perpetrated by Karadzic, and by military
forces under his control.4°
Karadzic argued he was not a state actor, and hence, not sus-
ceptible to the law of nations, which binds persons only when they
act under color of state law.41 The court disagreed. While crimes
such as torture and execution are proscribed by international law
only when committed by state officials, the law of nations has his-
torically been applied to private actors for the crimes of piracy and
slave trading, and for certain war crimes.42 "[Tihe availability of
the Alien Tort Act to remedy such violations was early recognized
by the Executive Branch in an opinion of Attorney General Brad-
ford in reference to acts of American Citizens aiding the French
fleet to plunder British property . . . ."" Thus, "crimes like rape,
torture, and summary execution, which by themselves require
state action for ATCA liability to attach, do not require state
action when committed in furtherance of other crimes ... which
by themselves do not require state action .... 44 The court further
36. As mentioned above, see supra text accompanying notes 1-2, this Comment
does not focus on whether courts have appropriately held ATCA liability as extending
to private parties. The following paragraphs are included as necessary to a factual
understanding of the Unocal case.
37. Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 8. Steinhardt is referring to the Kadic decision
discussed in the text immediately following this note.
38. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
39. Id. at 237.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 239.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra note 2, at *9 (emphasis in original).
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held that Filartiga was not in conflict because there the court "had
no occasion to consider whether international law violations other
than torture [were] actionable against private individuals ....
In Unocal, the court noted that there are two threshold ques-
tions in any ATCA case: (1) whether "the alleged tort is a viola-
tion of the law of nations,"46 and (2) when the action is against a
private party, "whether the alleged tort requires the private party
to engage in state action for ATCA liability to attach, and if so,
whether the private party in fact engaged in state action."47 As to
the forced labor claims, the District Court held that even though
Unocal knew "forced labor was being used" to benefit the joint
venture, plaintiffs' cause of action failed because "Unocal's con-
duct did not rise to the level of 'active participation' ..
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding, "[fiorced labor is a mod-
ern variant of slavery to which the law of nations attributes indi-
vidual liability," and that there was an issue of fact as to whether
Unocal may be liable under an "aiding and abetting" standard.49
Generally speaking, the aiding and abetting standard, which is
derived from international law, has two requirements: (1) An
actus reus requirement demanding "practical assistance or
encouragement which has a substantial effect on the perpetration
of the crime"; and (2) a mens rea requirement demanding "actual
or constructive . . .knowledge that the accomplice's action will
assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime." 0 Because
there were issues of fact as to whether Unocal hired the military
to provide security "in exchange for money or food," and because
"[tihe evidence... suggest[s] that Unocal knew that forced labor
was being utilized," the District Court's granting of summary
judgment was error.'
2. The Joint Action Test and the State Action Doctrine
The Unocal plaintiffs also argued Unocal's liability was based
45. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
46. As mentioned above, the parties stipulated so as to take this out of issue. See
supra text accompanying note 33.
47. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra note 2, at *9. The court held all jus cogens
violations are violations of the law of nations. Id. at *8. Jus cogens violations are
"violations of norms of international law that are binding on nations even if they do
not agree to them ...." Id. at *11. Jus cogens violations necessarily include torture,
murder, and slavery, and may include rape. Id. at *8.
48. Id. at *10.
49. Id. at *9, *10. This specific test will be discussed in more detail infra.
50. Id. at *14, *15.
51. Id. at *14-*15.
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on its symbiotic relationship with the military and Myanmar gov-
ernment. The crux of this argument is that a private party has
acted in concert with a state in committing, or with knowledge of,
violations of the law of nations. This argument is available when
the private party itself has not actually committed the violations.
The Supreme Court of the United States has enumerated four
tests for complicity in these situations:52 1) When a private party
endeavors to take on state responsibility; 2) when a private party
is in effect ordered by a state to commit a wrongful act; 3) where
the nexus between the private party and the state is such that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself;
and 4) a joint action test.
Unfortunately, these are not clear-cut and distinct tests, and
may simply be different ways of characterizing similar factual sit-
uations. 3 "Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court have
recognized that 'cases deciding when private action might be
deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency."'54
Furthermore, it is not at all clear from the case law the situations
in which it is appropriate to apply one or more of the above tests.
This is further indicative of why courts must abandon these types
of domestic substantive approaches.
Some courts have used the 'color of law' jurisprudence of 42
U.S.C. § 198311 as "a relevant guide to whether a defendant has
engaged in official action for purposes of jurisdiction under"
ATCA.56 Hence, the Unocal plaintiffs used § 1983 to satisfy the
joint action requirement by arguing the defendants were "liable
for violations of international law committed through collabora-
tion with a sovereign government."57
The Ninth Circuit has held under the joint action test that a
"private party [must be] 'a willful participant in joint action with
the State or its agents.' "58 Courts also find joint action by looking
to "whether state officials and private parties have acted in con-
52. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
53. Id. at 939. See also Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 11 ("The nexus standards to
date may well offer insufficient guidance to multinational corporations attempting in
good faith to avoid liability under [ATCA].").
54. Unocal District Court Opinion, supra note 29, at 1305.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (Civil action for deprivation of rights).
56. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995).
57. Ridenour, supra note 9, at 590.
58. Unocal District Court Opinion, supra note 29, at 1305 (citing Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)).
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cert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights."59
Yet another way to prove joint action is to "demonstrate a conspir-
acy between the private and state actors."6 0 Finally, "[a] private
individual [also] acts under 'color of law' . . . when he acts with
significant state aid."
61
It is obvious that the domestic approaches can be more than
just a little confusing. In their defense, perhaps the easiest way to
understand them is to condense the above four tests into the final
'joint action' test and use the first three as factors in the analysis.
For further insight, the principal § 1983 cases from which ATCA
principles are drawn are discussed below.
In Collins v. Womancare,l abortion protestors sued Woman-
care, an abortion clinic, for civil rights violations under § 1983.
Womancare had obtained an injunction prohibiting protestors
from picketing within a certain distance of its property.' When
Womancare attempted to serve plaintiffs with the injunction and
move them across the street, plaintiffs refused. After the police
arrived, an officer informed a Womancare employee of her right to
make a citizen's arrest. The Womancare employee, upon her
attorney's advice, performed a citizen's arrest, and the plaintiffs
subsequently sued, arguing the employee had acted under color of
law by effecting an arrest in concert with a police officer.66
There were no allegations of a conspiracy, and the court
looked instead to whether the Womancare employee had "will-
fully" participated in state action with the police officers.67 The
59. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, at 1453 (10th Cir.
1995).
60. Unocal District Court Opinion, supra note 29, at 1306.
61. Id. at 1305.
62. It is necessary to point out that the § 1983 body of law is extremely
voluminous, spreading across nearly all the federal circuits in thousands of opinions.
The § 1983 cases discussed in this Comment are those specifically relied on by ATCA
cases. It would be impossible and disadvantageous to discuss all § 1983 cases because
many cases are Circuit specific, and an attempt to discuss and reconcile all of them
would necessitate an article within an article. Instead of touching upon every single
test articulated within § 1983 jurisprudence, the author leaves this general
description of § 1983 to the reader as further evidence that such body of law is ill
suited to provide the substantive basis for ATCA. The specific international
standards articulated by the Unocal and Dusko Tadic cases (discussed below) have
the advantages of simplicity and cohesiveness that the domestic jurisprudence so
sorely lacks.
63. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1989).
64. Id. at 1146.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1146, 1154.
67. Id. at 1154.
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court noted that such joint action "requires a substantial degree of
cooperati[on] .. ."68 Because the facts failed to establish that the
state had "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdepen-
dence with [Womancare employees] that it must be recognized as
a joint participant in the challenged activity... [Instead], virtu-
ally all of the circumstances of this case point to the opposite
conclusion."69
The fatal facts included: (1) the "impetus for the arrests came
from Womancare employees and not San Diego police officers;"70
(2) the officer refused to make an arrest on his own authority;71 (3)
the plaintiffs failed to dispute that the officers maintained a posi-
tion of neutrality;72 and (4) "there is no indication in the record
that state agents failed to use independent judgment or in any
way coerced or encouraged Womancare employees to effect the cit-
izen's arrest."73 The court held the state failed to exercise any
actual authority and never intended to act for the private benefit
of Womancare.
In Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert,74 concertgoers
sued a concert promoter under § 1983 after being searched outside
of a Neil Young performance at the University of Utah. Two
weeks before the concert, university officials met to discuss the
implementation of appropriate security procedures before and
during the show.75 During this meeting, a promoter directed a
security company to perform the challenged searches.76
The court held the joint action test did not apply because the
facts failed to show that university officials participated in the
searches.77 The court acknowledged the four different tests articu-
lated by the Supreme Court 7 and analyzed the facts under each.79
The main issue under the nexus test is to establish the appro-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1155.
70. Id. (noting the officer actually attempted to discourage the arrest).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1156.
74. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, (10th Cir. 1995).
75. Id. at 1445.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1455.
78. Id. at 1456. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
79. The court defined the fourth test as the 'public function test.' Gallagher, 49
F.3d at 1456. This test is the least complicated and looks mainly to see if the state
has expressly delegated responsibility to a private party. It suffices to acknowledge
the mere existence of the public function test as one of many for determining state
action as further indicative of the problems in ATCA jurisprudence.
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priate link between the defendant and the alleged state actor.80 In
Gallagher, the court held that under the nexus test, "a state nor-
mally can be held responsible for private decision 'only when it
has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement ... that the choice must in law be deemed to be
that of the State."'81 Accordingly, the state must be responsible for
the "specific conduct" of the defendants.82 Mere funding or "acqui-
escence in the initiatives of a private party [are] not sufficient to
justify holding the State responsible "8.... 3 Here, there was no
direct nexus between University rules or policies and the searches
actually performed. Thus, the court found the requisite nexus
absent.84
In focusing on whether the searches "resulted from" a specific
state policy or decision, the court held, "[ulniversity rules and poli-
cies, standing alone, [were] .. .too general to supply" the neces-
sary link.8" There was no evidence that the university "influenced
the formulation or execution of this policy." 6 Nor did it matter
that university police were present during the searches. Because
the security company's "employees conducted the pat-down
searches pursuant to [their own policies], the observation of these
searches by University officers does not supply the required
nexus ."87
The court next addressed the issue of whether the defendants
were liable under a 'symbiotic relationship' test.8 The court noted
the leading case to be Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.89
In Burton, a restaurant leasing space in a publicly financed build-
ing refused to serve African-Americans. Public parking provided
available spaces to guests, and as the popularity of the restaurant
increased, so did the demand for such parking. The Burton court
held that the "profits earned by discrimination.., were indispen-
sable elements in the financial success of the governmental
80. Ridenour, supra note 9, at 590.




84. Id. at 1450.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1451.
88. Id. While the Gallagher court chose this label for the test, it is hard to see how
it is functionally different from the 'nexus test' or from findings of complicity under a
'color of law' analysis.
89. Id. at 1451 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961)).
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agency."9 According to the Court, the public nature of the con-
struction, the operation of the facility, and the mutual benefits
accruing between the two demonstrated a degree of state partici-
pation sufficient to constitute state action.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court noted, in determining suffi-
cient symbiotic relationships as in Burton, "a multitude of rela-
tionships might appear to some to fall within [the definition of
such a nexus, and] .. .differences in circumstances beget differ-
ences in law, limiting the actual holding to lessees of public prop-
erty."91 Hence, the precise scope of this doctrine is unclear, and
seems to have taken on an ad hoc quality.2 Not surprisingly,
some circuit courts have been reluctant to find the required rela-
tionship, while others have broken the inquiry down to a mere
finding of benefit from the wrongful action. Burton, though, has
been read very narrowly.9 3 "Extensive state regulation, the
receipt of substantial state funds, and the performance of impor-
tant public functions do not necessarily establish the kind of
symbiotic relationship ... required for state action."94
The Gallagher plaintiffs argued two factors in favor of a
symbiotic relationship: (1) the searches occurred on University
property, and (2) the University profited from the concert.95 The
court quickly dismissed the first factor as "clearly" insufficient. 6
As to the second factor, neither economic benefits nor non-eco-
nomic benefits were sufficient to establish the required
relationship. 7
In contrast to Burton, the record [failed to] establish that
the allegedly unconstitutional conduct generated profits
that were indispensable elements in the University's finan-
cial success ... Payments under government contracts and
the receipt of government grants ... are insufficient to
establish a symbiotic relationship between the government
and a private entity.9
90. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
91. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974).
92. "The applicable decisions clearly establish no bright-line rule for determining
whether a symbiotic relationship exists between a government agency and a private
entity. Questions as to how far the state has insinuated itself into the operations of a
particular private entity and when, if ever, the operations of a private entity become
indispensable to the state are matters of degree." Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1452.
93. Id. at 1451.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1452.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1453.
98. Id.
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Similarly, the fact that "policies of both [the security com-
pany] and the University... prohibited many of the same items
. .. [did] not mean that the two entities were functionally inter-
twined under the Burton standard."9 9 Even though the searches
revealed items prohibited by the university, "this assistance falls
far short of the degree of indispensability required by Burton."°°
Finally, the Gallagher court looked for complicity under a
"joint action test."10 Under this test, "courts examine whether
state officials and private parties have acted in concert in effecting
a particular deprivation of constitutional rights." °2 Of particular
importance is action by the private party rising to the level of
"willful" participation.' The relevant case law has diverged into
two lines. The first line focuses on intent to see whether the par-
ties have sufficiently conspired to deprive third parties of rights,
while the second focuses on the manner in which the alleged dep-
rivation is carried out. Under the "conspiracy" approach, "state
action may be found if a state actor has participated in or influ-
enced the challenged decision or action."10 4 The second approach
is satisfied "if there is a 'substantial degree of cooperative action'
... or if there is 'overt and significant state participation' ... in
carrying out the deprivation of plaintiffs constitutional rights
.... M15 This second approach is most consistent with Supreme
Court cases finding joint action where the harm is caused by state
actors responding to a legal procedure commenced by a private
party.
Plaintiffs argued two factors supporting a finding of joint
action: (1) the University policies gave one individual, Mr. James,
broad authority over the security procedures to be implemented;
and (2) the University and the security company shared a common
goal of producing "a musical concert from which each would bene-
fit financially."06 The court held neither factor established the
necessary "joint action."0 7
The university policies were silent as to the exact kind of
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Note what the Gallagher court refers to as the "joint action" test may be
quite different from how other courts have described the joint action test. This is
exactly the type of confusion that use of domestic jurisprudence brings to ATCA.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1454.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1455.
107. Id.
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security provided at concerts. "This silence establishes no more
than the University's acquiescence in the practices of the parties,"
which is insufficient to establish state action.108 Similarly, sharing
the common goal of making money "does not establish the neces-
sary degree of concerted action . . . [Sitate and private entities
must share a specific goal to violate the plaintiffs [rights]."1°9
Relying on the above cases, the District Court in Unocal
granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on the plain-
tiffs' remaining theories of liability. 10 "As in Gallagher, Unocal
and [the Burmese government] shared the goal of a profitable pro-
ject. However, . . . this shared goal does not establish joint action.
Plaintiffs present no evidence that Unocal 'participated in or influ-
enced' the military's unlawful conduct; nor do Plaintiffs present
evidence that Unocal 'conspired' with the military to commit the
challenged conduct."'
The District Court also held that when, as in this case, it is
the state actor committing the alleged violations, an additional
requirement of proximate cause is needed to hold the private
party liable under a theory of joint action." 2 "In order to establish
proximate cause, a plaintiff must prove that the private individu-
als exercised control over the [state's] decisions to commit the
§ 1983 violation."1 3  Here, "Plaintiffs present[ed] no evidence
[that] Unocal 'controlled' the Myanmar military's decision to...
commit the alleged tortuous acts ... ."I This requirement of prox-
imate cause is not yet a universal one. The Supreme Court has
yet to consider the issue, and the District Court in Unocal derives
this precedent from Ninth Circuit cases only.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's grant of sum-
mary judgment on the claims of murder and rape, but affirmed
the granting of summary judgment on the claims of torture." '5 The
court reaffirmed that "under Kadic, State action [would not be]
required for . . . acts [of rape and murder]" to give rise to
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Keep in mind that the District Court in Unocal did not analyze the plaintiffs'
claims in a bullet point approach similar to that of the Gallagher court. The District
Court did not take into account each test separately, but considered them all in one
paragraph. Unocal District Court Opinion, supra note 29, at 1306-07.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1307.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra note 2, at *24.
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liability."6
For acts of rape and murder committed by the military, the
court disregarded the tests articulated in Collins and Gallagher
and held that Unocal may be liable under the aforementioned aid-
ing and abetting test.'17 There were issues of fact as to whether
the same practical assistance evidence that supported liability for
forced labor also supplied the necessary actus reus and mens rea
requirements for rape and murder.' 18
However, the record did not "contain sufficient evidence to
establish a claim of torture .... Although a number of witnesses
described acts of extreme physical abuse that might give rise to a
claim of torture, the allegations all involved victims other than
Plaintiffs."" 9
III. WHY DOMESTIC JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT WORK AND
WHY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ARE READY
FOR INCORPORATION
ATCA, as presently interpreted, has resulted in ad hoc juris-
prudence that retains questionable legal solidarity. As ATCA has
slowly expanded to deal with the incredibly unbounded area of
international human rights violations, the resulting body of law
"remains largely a hodgepodge of lower court decisions .... "I"
"Victims of human rights abuses and their advocates fight an
uphill battle, looking for the cracks through which they can slip
their claims in an effort to find some means to seek justice, hold
those responsible accountable, and help prevent such abuses in
the future."12' As a result, a plaintiff's burden to establish that a
defendant has committed a tort and violated the law of nations or
a treaty, and thereby injured plaintiff, has been difficult to
sustain. 122
The inherent state action requirement of the ATCA has led
most courts to refuse jurisdiction in cases absent such
action, even where a clear violation of the law of nations
116. Id. at *15.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *16.
119. Id.
120. Ridenour, supra note 9, at 584. See also Simon, supra note 6, at 28 (noting
decisional law coming after Filartiga have produced a miasma of legal
interpretations).
121. Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 485, 493 (2001).
122. Randall, supra note 1, at 503.
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has been alleged .... Consequently, this requirement has
greatly limited the feasibility of the ATCA for claims
against private individuals.'23
Hence, use of the state action analogy is not only confusing,
but also results in plaintiffs rarely being able to survive summary
judgment. For those that do, the victories are, at the most, "phyr-
ric."1 24 This is exactly why the Ninth Circuit, as an en banc panel,
should affirm the Unocal decision in its entirety. Fortunately,
international law provides tests for liability of private individuals
and takes a significantly broader approach to liability than ...
ATCA does. 125 Further, the Unocal court is not alone in recogniz-
ing that a change needs to be made.
Following the Unocal decision, the court in Tachiona v.
Mugabe'26 held domestic jurisprudence inappropriate as the sub-
stantive basis for ATCA cases. However, the court did not take its
opinion as far as the Unocal court because it failed to delineate
specific international standards as appropriate substitutes.
Instead, the court stopped just short of Unocal by holding that, in
general, substantive principles should be drawn from interna-
tional law. The case is significant, though, because it is further
recent evidence that there are problems with the way ATCA is
currently interpreted.
In Tachiona, plaintiffs, citizens of Zimbabwe, sued the
county's ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front ("ZANU-PF"), alleging violations under ATCA.12
Plaintiffs alleged ZANU-PF 1) tortured and brutally murdered
three people;'28 2) unlawfully denied plaintiffs various political
freedoms, including denial of the rights of association, assembly,
and the right to participate in state's government; 129 3) subjected
plaintiffs to cruel and inhuman treatment; 130 and 4) racially dis-
criminated and unlawfully seized plaintiffs' property. 3'
123. Douglas S. Morrin, People Before Profits: Pursuing Corporate Accountability
For Labor Rights Violations Abroad Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 20 B.C. THiRD
WORLD L.J. 427, 433-34 (2000).
124. Simon, supra note 6, at 28.
125. Ridenour, supra note 9, at 592-93 (discussing the expansive scope of liability
under the Nuremberg tribunal system that dealt with the trials of high ranking Nazi
leaders and German industrialists after World War II).
126. 234 F.Supp. 2d 401, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
127. Id. at 405.
128. Id. at 420.
129. Id. at 423.
130. Id. at 435.
131. Id. at 439.
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Because ZANTU-PF failed to answer the complaint 1 2 or other-
wise appear, the District Court entered a default judgment and
referred the matter to a Magistrate judge for a determination of
damages. 33 The court adopted the factual findings in a report
issued by the Magistrate judge, but reserved judgment as to the
award under ATCA. 134 Because the court determined that, under
Filartiga, it was required to perform a choice of law analysis, and
because the matter had not been addressed prior to the Magis-
trate judge's report, the court ordered the parties to brief the
issue."' The court found it appropriate to "determine substantive
principles to be applied by looking to international law"136 and
adopted the Magistrate judge's recommendations pertaining to
ATCA damages with only one modification.3 7
The court began by noting, "adoption of [international] princi-
ples as the product of a choice of law evaluation of an ATCA claim
poses a significant quandary."3 8 The problem is one of adopting
"one [international] forum's pertinent law in its entirety" versus
comparatively identifying "various sources of relevant substantive
rights and principles from which the Court may draw in fashion-
ing the ATCA remedy most appropriate under the circumstances
of the case."1 39 The court chose the latter, holding "[VI arious inter-
national declarations, covenants and resolutions catalogue rights
all persons should enjoy; affirm the obligations of nations to
ensure those rights by means of implementing legislation; exhort
governments to protect and promote widely recognized rights; and
pronounce the global community's condemnations and renuncia-
tions of wrongful practices."' 0 In the alternative, choosing, for
example, solely Zimbabwe law would deny plaintiffs recovery and
132. The Court found jurisdiction over the claims against ZANU-PF through
process personally served on Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe, who is also the
head of ZANU-PF. Id. at 405.
133. Id. at 406.
134. Id.
135. "With regard to the ATCA claims, the Court determined that under its reading
of applicable Second Circuit doctrine, . . . it was required to perform a choice of law
analysis to determine the appropriate substantive law governing the adjudication of
ATCA disputes alleging human rights abuses." Id.
136. Id. at 413.
137. The Court denied plaintiffs' general request for punitive damages in
connection with the claims asserting unlawful seizure of property. "There [was] no
evidence on the record to support a finding that [international sources of law] would
authorize the awarding of punitive damages in connection with" such a claim. Id. at
441.
138. Id. at 407.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 409.
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defeat the entire purpose of ATCA."I
In holding that international law was the appropriate sub-
stantive basis, the court first noted,
[T]he challenge [of determining the appropriate standards]
has engendered significant conceptual division and diver-
gent practices among the courts that have addressed the
question. . . . However, several considerations counsel
against... [an] unyielding reliance to municipal law.., to
supply the exclusive substantive cause of action and rules
of decision governing the adjudication of the merits of inter-
national human rights claims invoking the ATCA.
The court cited two main reasons why municipal law is ill
suited for the task, and why courts must graft the appropriate
substantive tests from an array of international sources.'4 First,
the court reiterated that Congress, intending ATCA be inter-
preted broadly, "entrusted to the federal courts the task of deter-
mining the substantive rights to be applied to ATCA claims by
reference to international standards, as well as the 'power to
choose and develop federal remedies to effectuate the purposes of
the international law incorporated into United States common
law.' 1 44 Doing such not only furthers "the federal policy embodied
in the ATCA", but also effectuates "the clear objectives reflected in
the international prohibition against"jus cogens violations.145
Second, in response to the call for adopting strictly the law of
the jurisdiction where the violations take place, the court
responded, "several conceptual, policy and practical constraints
caution against strict adherence to municipal rules of the foreign
141. "[Tlhe governing law of Zimbabwe, while in general terms recognizing some of
the rights Plaintiffs invoke here under ATCA, does not define specific cause of action
to vindicate the particular claims asserted, or does not permit recovery of the kinds of
damages Plaintiffs seek, or may otherwise bar liability. . . ." Id. at 408.
142. Id. at 411-12.
143. The Court actually cited four reasons, but only two are pertinent to this
Comment. The second rationale is a three-paragraph recitation of how other courts
have rejected a strict adherence to municipal law, and the results justifying these
decisions. Id. at 413-14. The fourth rationale states, "A final drawback to a choice of
law approach mandating strict adherence to municipal law in redressing
international law violations in ATCA cases is the practical and jurisprudential
complexities that inhere in discerning, construing and enforcing substantive rules of
decision formulated by foreign courts, legislatives or administrative bodies. ...
Though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide guidance for federal courts in
applying foreign law, this authority does not mitigate the conceptual and pragmatic
obstacles always associated with in [sic] the task." Id. at 418.
144. Id. at 413 (citing Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980)).
145. Tachiona, 234 F.Supp. 2d at 413. See also supra note 47.
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state in defining the scope of substantive rights and causes of
action .... ,,146 For example,
[Alnother limitation inherent in placing undue reliance on
municipal law of the foreign state in choice of law analysis
is reflected in actions ... that charge egregious misconduct
by the sitting government itself through measures taken by
the highest ranking officers of the regime. These are the
very officials whose public duties encompass enacting,
enforcing and construing domestic laws, and deciding the
state's compliance with international norms. It is unlikely
to escape the notice of government leaders who defile the
powers of their offices by resorting to the barbarism of
state-sponsored torture and murder, and to the brutalities
characteristic of inhuman treatment of their nation's own
people, to equally dishonor the municipal justice system
and its laws in order to immunize themselves from account-
ability and liability for their wrongs. 4 v
In addition, "because customary international norms are not
always fixed in codifications and treaties, not every nation will
necessarily reflect clearly in its domestic jurisprudence principles
that manifest its unequivocal assent and adherence to universal
standards that may override municipal rules." 48  As a
consequence:
[T]he magnitude of genocide and murder by torture and
extrajudicial killing may have to be adjudged and remedied
in accordance with ordinary civil tort standards prescribed
in wrongful death statutes. Wholesale degradations and
deprivations of all traces of human dignity perpetrated by
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment may be civilly pros-
ecuted under local principles defining assault and battery
or infliction of emotional distress. Forced disappearance
and prolonged arbitrary detention may be classified as false
imprisonment.149
Hence, the Southern District of New York has agreed to some
extent with the Unocal court. Adherence to a strict domestic juris-
prudence approach, whether the applicable law is extracted from
the U.S. or from the foreign jurisdiction at issue, is confusing,
146. Tachiona, 234 F.Supp. 2d at 414.
147. Id. at 415.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 416.
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complicated, and counterintuitive to the policy of ATCA. 15° How-
ever, the Tachiona court did not adopt specific international stan-
150. The Tachiona Court also relied heavily on Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp.
162 (D. Mass. 1995), decided seven years earlier. In Xuncax, nine Guatemalan
citizens brought suit against Hector Gramajo ("Gramajo"), Guatemala's former Vice
Chief of Staff and director of the Army General Staff, commander of the military zone
where plaintiffs lived, and Minister of Defense. Id. at 169, 171. Plaintiffs alleged
"Gramajo bears personal responsibility for the numerous acts of gruesome violence
inflicted by military personnel who were under his direct command." Id at 169.
Using the military, he "order[ed] and direct[ed] the implementation of the program of
persecution and oppression that resulted in the terrors visited upon the plaintiffs and
their families." Id. at 171. As a result, armed forces "ransacked [plaintiffs'] villages
.. [,] subjected [plaintiffs] to torture and arbitrary detention . .. t, and] forced
[plaintiffs] to watch as their family members were tortured to death or summarily
executed . . . . Id. at 169. Plaintiffs served Gramajo while he was in the U.S.
(attending a function at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government), and
he filed a pro se answer. Gramajo subsequently "declined to participate further in
[the] proceedings by refusing to even respond to Court orders requiring him to furnish
a current address for service." Id. Just as in Tachiona, the Court entered a default
judgment against the defendant. Id.
The Court found subject matter jurisdiction under ATCA, and proceeded with its
discussion and analysis of whether "[t]he substantive rule of decision in a case
maintained under [ATCA] is . . .provided by the municipal tort law under which
plaintiffs bring their claims." Id. at 179-181. The Court answered this question in the
negative, holding that "simply applyfing] the relatively definite and concrete
standards of liability as set out in . . . municipal tort law .. . [is] neither consistent
with the terms of [ATCA] nor with its manifest intent .... [T]here appears little
warrant to look to municipal law exclusively" given its "seeming inadequacy ... to
address .. . such human rights violations as . . .torture [and] summary execution
.... " Id. at 182, 183. Hence, just as the Tachiona and Unocal Courts held, courts
should look to international law for the appropriate substantive tests.
Here, the Court cited three main reasons why international law should provide
the appropriate substantive basis for ATCA. First, while the task of fashioning tests
from the "'amorphous body' of international law [can be daunting], it is hardly out of
scale with similar challenges federal courts have successfully addressed in the past."
Id. at 182. Second, "by not tethering [ATCA] to causes of action and remedies
previously developed under roughly analogous municipal law, the federal courts will
be better able to develop a uniform federal common law response to international law
violations, a result consistent with the statute's intent in conferring federal court
jurisdiction over such actions in the first place." Id. Finally, by looking to
international law, "courts will be freer to incorporate the full range of diverse
elements that should be drawn upon to resolve international legal issues than they
would if bound to a straightforward recurrence to extant domestic law." Id.
However, the Court acknowledged the downside of "leaving courts free to draw
upon diverse sources of law. . ." Id. at 183 (emphasis in original). "[N]ovel questions
arise when United States Courts are obliged to discern, interpret, and then enforce
standards of liability framed by foreign courts or legislative bodies, simply because
the underlying cause of action may (or may not) be coincident with or analogous to an
alleged violation of international law." Id. (emphasis in original). For example, the
Court here required testimony from "Professor Alejandro M. Garro regarding the
provisions and principles of the Guatemalan law that [were] pertinent to this case."
Id. at 196.
Also, when it is not clear who determines which municipal law is applicable, one
of two problems inevitably will arise: 1) Leaving to the Court to determine which law
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dards appropriate for incorporation. Perhaps, this was because
the Magistrate judge had already done the work of achieving the
desired result, or because, with only one party appearing in the
case, there was no incentive to push for any specificity. In either
case, a court in the Second Circuit has now seen fit to disregard
the traditional approach of adjudicating ATCA claims via domes-
tic jurisprudence.'51
While the Tachiona court deserves credit for taking steps
away from ATCA's history of using domestic jurisprudence, it
should have followed the Unocal court more precisely and adopted
specific international standards ready for incorporation. Availa-
ble standards ready for incorporation are discussed below. Under
the Nuremberg tribunal system, the courts utilized an "aiding and
abetting" standard that required a much lower threshold for
establishing the nexus between states and private parties.1"2 This
has become the accepted standard for criminal liability in many of
the institutions and documents formulated to deal with criminal
violations of international law.153
The court in Unocal was the first domestic court to incorpo-
rate the 'aiding and abetting' approach into ATCA jurisprudence.
The court affirmed that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals are
indeed an appropriate source of guidance for ATCA interpretation
because they are "judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing" the
is invoked creates a "troublesome conflation of jurisdictional and substantive
concerns"; and 2) leaving it to the plaintiff encourages "problems of 'domestic law
shopping.'" Id.
However, the Court could have avoided such a conundrum by doing exactly what
the Unocal Court did: adopt specific international substantive tests. Doing such
obviates both problems discussed above by taking the decision away from both the
plaintiffs and the courts. In addition, all parties would, prior to entering the
courthouse, be served with some measure of predictability by knowing exactly which
principles define the scope of the defendants' liability.
151. However, the reader must remember that the Tachiona decision is a district
court decision. Since the defendants never once appeared during the trial phase, it is
most likely that there will not be an appeal. However, it is entirely possible that,
following the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in the Unocal case, the Second Circuit
will not hesitate in immediately hearing the next ATCA case brought on appeal.
152. "[A]n individual may be guilty for aiding and abetting an offense that he did
not directly commit; and command responsibility, which attributes certain acts of
subordinates to the superior." Stephen R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 492 (2001).
153. Ridenour, supra note 9, at 594-95 (expanding criminal liability, the Yugoslav
Tribunal makes persons individually responsible for any act that aids or abets the
execution of a crime). See also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals
Chamber, IT-94-1-A (ICTY, July 15, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic
appealjudgment/index_2.htm (last visited April 20, 2003).
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law of nations.' Furthermore, the shift is warranted because
"District Courts [have been] increasingly turning to the decisions
by international criminal tribunals for instructions regarding the
standards of international human rights law under.. . ATCA."1 5
As mentioned in Section II, the aiding and abetting standard
contains two elements: an actus reus, and a mens rea. The practi-
cal assistance needed for the actus reus to exist "'need not consti-
tute an indispensable element, that is, a conditio sine qua non for
acts of the principle.' . . . Rather, it suffices that 'the acts of the
accomplice make a significant difference to the commission of the
criminal act by the principle. ' 1 6 In other words, the actus reus is
"'all acts of assistance . . . that substantially contributed to the
commission of the crime. '""'57 The mens rea element requires
"actual or constructive . . . 'knowledge that [the accomplice's]
actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the
crime. '"'15 "'[Ilt is not necessary for the accomplice to
[either] share the mens rea [sic] of the perpetrator, in the sense of
positive intention to commit the crime... [, or know] the precise
crime that the principle intends to commit. '""' 9 "Rather, if the
accused 'is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be
committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has
intended to facilitate the commission of that crime...""0 In sum-
mary, the aiding and abetting standard may be satisfied when
there exists "knowing practical assistance, encouragement, or
moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration
of the crime."''
Following Unocal's lead, courts can derive two other available
tests from the case of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic.'62 In Dusko
Tadic, the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia had to "determine whether the Bosnian Serb
army was part of the armed forces of Serbia; a positive finding
would mean that the war in Bosnia was an interstate war and
154. Unocal Appeals Court Decision, supra note 2, at *11 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)) (emphasis in original).
155. Id. at *12 (emphasis in original).
156. Id.





162. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-A
(ICTY, July 15, 1999), at para. 195, available at http://www.un.orgicty/tadic/appea/
judgment/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2003).
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would thereby trigger protections of civilians .. and make certain
breaches of [the Geneva convention] war crimes."163 The defen-
dant was a military leader within the army who allegedly commit-
ted numerous human rights violations. The Tribunal noted three
categories of liability for private individuals acting in concert with
states to effect violations of human rights:"M 1) Instances where
all defendants acting pursuant to a common design possess the
same criminal intent; 2) where there is active participation in the
enforcement of repression coupled with knowledge of the nature of
the system and intent to further its design; and 3) where the per-
petrators commit an act outside of a common design to pursue one
course of conduct, but the act is a natural and foreseeable conse-
quence of effecting the common purpose.'65 Thus, at international
law an accused is guilty not only for the intended outcome of the
criminal activity, but also for crimes that are reasonably expected
to flow from the common enterprise."
In addition, a distinction concerning the character of the pri-
vate party gives rise to additional liability of the state. As the
Dusko Tadic court noted, "when the private party is not a military
or paramilitary group, the level of control must be much more sub-
stantial and include either specific instructions from the state con-
cerning the commission of the wrongful act, or an endorsement of
a completed violation."167 Hence, the test varies according to the
nature of the party committing the act. Where the party holds a
military status, the state is per se liable as long as it has overall
control of the group by means of equipping, financing, coordinat-
ing, or general planning." In other words, "the acts of an armed
group are attributable to a state as long as the state 'has a role in
organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions' of the
group ... ."I69 The state does not have to necessarily control "par-
ticular operations."7 °
163. Ratner, supra note 152, at 499.
164. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-A
(ICTY, July 15, 1999), at para. 195, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/
judgment/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2003).
165. See Ratner, supra note 152, at 490 (discussing other rules for assessing the
responsibility of the state or individuals).
166. Craig Forcese, ATCA's Achilles Heel: Corporate Complicity, International Law
and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 YALE L.J. 487, 509 (2001).
167. Id. at 508.
168. Id. at 510.
169. Ratner, supra note 152, at 499
170. Id. at 499 (citing Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals
Chamber, IT-94-1-A (ICTY, July 15, 1999), available at httpJ/www.un.orgicty/tadic/
appealljudgmentlindex.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2003)).
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IV. WHAT THE NINTH CIRCUIT WILL HEAR NEXT
This section briefly discusses the arguments of both sides'
petitions for and against the rehearing en banc in the Unocal case.
The Ninth Circuit granted Unocal's petition for rehearing and set
oral argument for June 2003. The following arguments are what
the court can expect to hear and a brief commentary on these
arguments. Unocal makes four main arguments in favor of a
reversal: 1) The Unocal court's "standard for aiding and abetting
liability is an unprecedented and unwarranted expansion of liabil-
ity under [ATCA"' 7 1; 2) because the standard does not require
actual knowledge, but only constructive knowledge, such standard
contradicts domestic law approaches to co-tortfeasor liability;172 3)
the court erred by not adhering to the § 1983 jurisprudence tradi-
tionally used in ATCA cases;173 and, 4) the "application of [the] aid-
ing and abetting standard to the evidence is internally
inconsistent .... 174
First, Unocal argues the aiding and abetting standard was
originally promulgated by an "ad hoc international tribunal ...
whose interpretations are subject to change .... 75 Hence, such
standard "lacks universal acceptance and definition" because it is
not part of customary international law. 76 Additionally, Unocal
171. Unocal's Petition for Panel Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc at 4, John
Doe I v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002)(Nos. CV-96-6959 and CV-96-6112)
[hereinafter Unocal Petition for Rehearing].
172. Id. at 6.
173. Id. at 9.
174. Id. at 12. Unocal argues an additional point: "The deleterious impact of the
decision is further amplified by the reality . . . that Unocal's investment was
permitted by federal statute." Id. at 9. The "majority's standard is particularly
problematic in a case such as this where the political branches of government have
permitted the very investment challenged in court" and concluded that such
investments are consistent with United States foreign policy. Id. at 8. The author
finds troubling the argument that because Congress has authorized a business
venture it has implicitly authorized any and all means aimed at completing such
venture. While it may be true Congress recognizes the importance of extending this
country's reach in gathering natural resources, it hardly seems Congress intended a
foreign country's reputation for human rights violations to immunize a private party
from liability for violations committed in concert with said foreign country. See id. at
9.
175. Id. at 5.
176. Further, Unocal argues the standard fails the above requirement because the
Court adopted a less restrictive version of the test. The Court left the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's "inclusion of [a] 'moral support"' prong out of its
version. Id. However, as plaintiffs point out, "[niot all rules applied as federal
common law in ATCA cases must be universally adopted in the same form in every
detail . . . ." Plaintiffs' Response To Petition for Panel Rehearing and for Rehearing
En Banc at 6, John Doe I v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002)(Nos. CV-96-
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urges that the panel's adoption of aiding and abetting is inappro-
priate because such standard is historically only concerned with
"liability for military or militia members for war crimes commit-
ted by ... military subordinates ....
As argued by the plaintiffs, Unocal first contention is seri-
ously flawed. 178 The "specific, universal and obligatory" language
refers only to whether plaintiffs alleged a particular violation of
the law of nations. It does not relate to whether particular sub-
stantive international tests are appropriate for ATCA incorpora-
tion. If Unocal were correct, "there [could] be no ATCA liability
unless every legal rule employed in an ATCA case has won univer-
sal adherence in international law from [the majority] of [all inter-
national] court[s], tribunal[s], and state[s]."' 7  Such a holding
would "utterly thwart the enforcement of the ATCA ... ."180
Finally, plaintiffs argue it is unclear whether Unocal's actions
were in fact military abuses committed "pursuant to 'a policy of
forced labor.' 18 1
Second, Unocal contends the Court erred because its aiding
and abetting standard does not require actual knowledge for lia-
bility to attach. Unocal likens the constructive knowledge prong
to negligence, which "is not a principle of international law, much
less a specific, universal and obligatory international norm."1 2
Not only do plaintiffs argue Unocal improperly raises this argu-
ment for the first time on appeal,8 3 but distinguish Central Bank
as a case only dealing with the specific language of the Securities
Exchange Act."M In contrast, "ATCA plainly authorizes federal
courts to adjudicate claims [derived from] international law,"18 5
and the aiding and abetting clearly falls within that category.
Third, Unocal argues the court erred because, under § 1983,
private actors cannot be liable for conduct of "government officials
unless the private actor controlled the conduct of those officials."88
6959 and CV-96-6112) (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass.
1995) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Response to Petition].
177. Unocal Petition for Rehearing, supra note 170, at 5.
178. Plaintiffs' Response to Petition, supra note 176, at 1-2.
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id. at 7.
182. Unocal Petition for Rehearing, supra note 170, at 8 (citing Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) for this proposition).
183. Plaintiffs' Response to Petition, supra note 176, at 9-10.
184. Id. at 10. See also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 182 (limiting its holding to the
securities statute).
185. Plaintiffs' Response to Petition, supra note 176, at 10.
186. Unocal Petition for Rehearing, supra note 170, at 9-10.
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Hence, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of defendants. Rather than taking the position of this Com-
ment, that § 1983 should be completely eliminated from ATCA
jurisprudence, plaintiffs argue certain international law claims do
not fall within that category of violations governed by the § 1983
"control" test.187 Plaintiffs rely on the Kadic case, 8 which held
certain violations so egregious (i.e. slave trading, piracy, genocide,
etc.) that the character (private or state) of the tortfeasor was
irrelevant for ATCA purposes.'89 Because the violations involved
forcing "relocation of villagers at gunpoint to act as unpaid por-
ters" and "rapes and murders . ..as terror tactic[s]" plaintiffs
analogize the Unocal claims to those "universally condemned" by
the Kadic case. 9 °
Finally, Unocal argues the three-judge panel erred in holding
questions of fact exist under a test requiring "practical assistance"
because "[t]here is no evidence that Unocal ever requested the
Myanmar military" to do anything. 9' However, it seems this
argument is unavailing. The record reflects evidence that, at the
least, raise issues of fact whether Unocal actively engaged the
Myanmar military. As plaintiffs point out, "a cable from the U.S.
Embassy in Rangoon, Myanmar, reported that [a] Unocal . . .
[rlepresentative . . . 'stated forthrightly that the companies have
hired the Burmese military to provide security for the project.""92
In addition, the same representative "indicated ... TotalfUnocal
uses [photos, surveys, and maps] to show the [military] where
they need helipads built and facilities secured ... ""I
Unocal attempts to dilute such record evidence by arguing
most information available to Unocal was supplied via a "briefing
book" and other documents prepared in their entirety by Total.'
"[R] eceiving reports in a briefing does not amount to participation;
indeed, the fact that Unocal needed to be briefed itself contradicts
the conclusion that Unocal participated in the conduct under dis-
187. Plaintiffs' Response to Petition, supra note 176, at 12.
188. See Steinhardt, supra note 1.
189. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
190. Plaintiffs' Response to Petition, supra note 176, at 13-14.
191. Unocal Petition for Rehearing, supra note 170, at 13.
192. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra note 2, at *2 (emphasis in original); see also
Plaintiffs' Response to Petition, supra note 176, at 16.
193. Unocal Petition for Rehearing, supra note 170 at 3. Total was the French oil
company that originally established the natural gas project in Burma. Id. at 1.
Unocal acquired its 28% interest in the project from Total. Id.
194. Id. at 13.
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cussion.""95 However, this contention assumes Total did all the
work regarding the project, and Unocal seemingly failed to partici-
pate following acquisition of its 28% interest. In a project of this
magnitude, such contention is probably without merit.
V. WHY ATCA SHOULD Focus MORE ON INCORPORATING
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
A. A Transition Away from Domestic Jurisprudence
State responsibility at international law is a body of law the
application of which depends on courts being prepared to adopt a
somewhat different approach to ATCA than they have done in the
past.196 The courts must adopt and invert the roles of relevant
parties, similar to the way in which present ATCA jurisprudence
has relied on various other tests to attribute State wrongs to indi-
viduals. 97 A court taking it upon itself to do such may find inter-
national standards much simpler to apply and more damaging to
potential wrongdoers than the often-ambiguous tests mentioned
in section 11.198
In support of making this transition, scholars have pointed
out that the use of domestic standards are inadequate surrogates
for international legal standards in ATCA cases and run counter
to the policy and reasoning behind ATCA jurisprudence and legis-
lative intent.199
"[R]eading [ATCA] as essentially a jurisdictional grant only
and then looking to domestic tort law to provide the cause of
action mutes the grave international law aspect of the tort, reduc-
ing it to no more . . . than a garden-variety municipal tort.""'
"[Tihe needs of the.., international system are better served by
applying international rather than national law .... ." because
"'the relevant policies of the forum' cannot be ascertained by...
ignoring . . . decisions which have favored other law, including
international law."2°'
However, most commentators have merely acknowledged the
usefulness of ATCA jurisprudence and acknowledged the availa-
195. Id.
196. Forcese, supra note 166, at 510.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. "[T]hese [domestic] tests set a relatively high standard, as a result of which
plaintiffs have lost key cases." Id.
200. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra note 2, at *11 (emphasis in original).
201. Id.
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bility of alternate international tests. Few commentators have
pushed for real change or argued that specific sources of interna-
tional law are better suited and more workable for these types of
cases. Following the lead of the Unocal court and universally
adopting a shift away from § 1983 jurisprudence will not only give
ATCA the air of predictability that is has so sorely lacked, but will
also make ATCA a much more useful tool against foreign and
domestic defendants who think they can violate human rights
with impunity.
B. The Worthy Substitutes
1. Aiding and Abetting
When courts decide to make a switch and adopt a more expan-
sive legal standard than the one presently in use, there will be an
inevitable problem of inconsistency and/or incoherence of terms.
The challenge will be one of actively defining, and refining, a set of
definitions that crystallizes the appropriate tests. Fortunately,
this is not an improbability. The Unocal court has taken the first
steps towards making real change by incorporating one interna-
tional test, the aiding and abetting test, into ATCA jurisprudence.
The court began by acknowledging the similarity between the
aiding and abetting standard and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 876 (1979).202 Although this international test was devel-
oped in the context of criminal sanctions, and the Restatement is a
source of civil law, this distinction makes no difference in terms of
the test's usefulness. In fact, the aforementioned similarity
makes the court's "slightly modified" international test especially
appropriate."3 Hence, carving out a workable and cognizable
scope of definitions delineating "aiding and abetting" is clearly not
an impossible task. As the Unocal court noted, doing such will
encourage "certainty, predictability . . .uniformity of result ...
ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied," and "the protection of justified expectations[.] "2°4 The
202. Id. at *13. The Restatement reads, "For harm resulting to a third person from
the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in
concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that
the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance
to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 876 (1979).
203. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra note 2, at *13.
204. Id. at *11.
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Tachiona court wholeheartedly agreed,
As a body of federal law develops under [the approach of
adopting international standards], so as to give content to
an ATCA right of action and thus fill in interstices with fed-
eral decisional rules, the federal courts' response acquires
the virtues of uniformity and recognition of more diverse
sources of substantive standards to draw upon in shaping
remedies for adjudication of ATCA claims.... [Bly not teth-
ering [the ATCA] to causes of action and remedies previ-
ously developed under roughly analogous municipal law,
federal courts will be better able to develop a uniform fed-
eral common law response to international law violations, a
result consistent with the statute's intent in conferring fed-
eral court jurisdiction over such actions in the first place.2"'
As a result, not only will the Unocal plaintiffs have their
chance for a meaningful day in court, but also, if courts follow the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning, future defendants will have guidelines
for defining their potential liability.
2. The Dusko Tadic Approaches
The first category of criminality discussed by the Appeals
Chamber20 6 in Dusko Tadic focuses not only on intent but also on
knowledge and active participation. This approach embraces a
"zone of danger" test in which defendants are responsible for the
natural and foreseeable consequences of their actions in working
to affect a common goal or purpose.2 7
This test is effective because it finds liability in the gray areas
created by the domestic jurisprudence. This is most important in
situations like those giving rise to the Unocal case. For example,
before Unocal acquired an interest in the joint venture, it hired a
consulting company to assess the risks involved. They were sub-
sequently informed that the Burmese government "habitually
makes use of forced labor to construct roads."20 8 This prompted a
Unocal vice president to admit that in using the Myanmar mili-
tary for protection, "[P]ipeline construction . . . might proceed in
[a] manner that would be out of our control and not ... in a man-
ner that we would like to see them proceed .... ,,2" Not surpris-
205. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F.Supp. 2d 401, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Xuncax
v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 182 (D. Mass. 1995)).
206. Forcese, supra note 166, at 500-01.
207. Id.
208. Unocal Appeal Decision, supra note 2, at *4.
209. Id. at *5.
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ingly, on four separate occasions between March 1995 and
February 1996, Unocal was informed that the military was proba-
bly using forced labor and was probably committing human rights
violations.21 °
Since the domestic jurisprudence discussed in Part II focuses
on willfulness, intent, level of encouragement, and active partici-
pation in pursuit of a common goal, defendants like Unocal will
most likely avoid liability in situations where, considering ATCA's
purpose, complete exoneration seems fundamentally wrong. By
extending liability to foreseeable consequences, the first approach
of the Dusko Tadic tribunal resembles the accepted aiding and
abetting standard by punishing defendants who are "aware that
• .. a number of crimes will probably be committed" when human
rights are indeed violated. 1' At a minimum this will, like the aid-
ing and abetting standard, also further the "basic polic[y] underly-
ing [ATCA]" by providing some meaningful access to "tort
remedies for violations of international law."212
Second, adopting the "per se" approach to liability formulated
in Dusko Tadic is perhaps the simplest way to hold a certain class
of defendants liable for violations of the law of nations. This test
comprises two simple elements: 1) a military or paramilitary
group as a defendant (private or state); and 2) a showing of overall
control that can be satisfied by a showing of equipping, financing,
coordinating, or general planning.2
13
As reliance upon this standard develops, plaintiffs will no
longer have to worry about the resulting body of law becoming one
of ad hoc jurisprudence. Since the first part of the test is rela-
tively simple, it is unlikely that courts will differ a great deal in
determining whether the party at issue is a military group. How-
ever, there still remains the question of what "role" the state must
play in order to exercise "overall control." Obviously, adopting
standards of § 1983 jurisprudence requiring willful participation,
etc. would defeat the purpose of adopting the new standard. For-
tunately, the Tribunal anticipated this by holding that the state
does not have to control "particular operations."21 4 The inference
is that a level of complicity below actual knowledge or actual par-
210. Id. at *5-*6.
211. Id. at *13.
212. Id. at *12.
213. Forcese, supra note 166, at 510.
214. Ratner, supra note 152, at 499 (citing Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of
the Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-A (ICTY, July 15, 1999), available at http://www.un.
org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgment/index_2.htm (last visited April 20, 2003).
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ticipation will suffice. Standards similar to that of the actus reus
and mens rea requirements of the aiding and abetting test could
very easily be incorporated to make this a much better substitute
when military or paramilitary groups are involved.
Finally, it must be noted that there is one criticism in adopt-
ing this approach. Adopting any per se standard entails develop-
ing notions of strict liability. If courts choose to more readily use
this standard, this result will have to be carefully considered, as it
has been suggested ATCA is no place for strict liability.215 This
concern has come in the context of states acting in concert with
corporate defendants, "[s]uch a standard does not suggest that
any ties, or even any significant ties, between the government and
the corporation per se create corporate responsibility for the gov-
ernment's acts .... More would have to be shown... [in cases of]
loose[r] ties."216
3. Does it Really Matter Anyway?
Even though "ATCA is increasingly being used by plaintiffs
.... [and] should become even more helpful"217 as "the interna-
tional norms of the law of nations continue to evolve and
expand[,]" 2"' we must question whether any changes will actually
make a difference. In fact, no defendant subject to an ATCA judg-
ment has ever been forced to pay. Despite the nature and argua-
bly utopian effectiveness of the international standards discussed
above, admittedly, none of them really address the ability to force
defendants to actually "ante up."
[E]ven if plaintiffs were able to demonstrate
that... [defendants] had been responsible for the actions of
the security forces they employed, courts could not provide
an appropriate remedy. An appropriate remedy is impossi-
ble because our federal courts have no authority in the
realm of international relations to regulate the military
security forces of a sovereign nation and they certainly lack
the authority to punish the foreign sovereign actors or rem-
edy the atrocities they have committed.... 2 19
215. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS 320 (1977).
216. Ratner, supra note 152, at 502.
217. Morrin, supra note 123, at 437.
218. Id.
219. Demian Betz, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible For Human
Rights Abuses Committed By Security Forces In Conflict-Ridden Nations: An
Argument Against Exporting Federal Jurisdiction for the Purpose of Regulating
Corporate Behavior Abroad, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 163, 195 (2001).
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Suppose an ATCA suit were to be litigated to the bitter end,
resulting in a billion dollar judgment. . . . What result?
Payment would be rendered to plaintiffs and their attor-
neys, but what about the cause of the abuses at the root of
the litigation? How would the judgment impact or change
the source of the problem? It would do nothing .... Thus,
[these suits] are not achieving justice for the people who
really need it. The victorious plaintiffs are few, while the
source of the harm remains unchanged in the outcome of
the litigation.22 °
From a point of view focusing on individual retribution, it
seems fruitless to debate the merits of domestic jurisprudence and
international standards if neither is better suited to actually com-
pensate the injured plaintiff. However, if the point is subjecting
defendants to ATCA complicity merely because the alternative
(implicitly condoning violations of human rights by doing nothing)
is morally and politically unacceptable,22' then a change to a more
coherent, effective, and cognizable body of law is necessary. 2 As
mentioned at the beginning, though, this Comment seeks to rem-
edy the theory of the statute. Its practicality, in the context of
actually putting dollars in the plaintiffs pocket, is something left
for another day.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hence, the stage is set for the Ninth Circuit, as an en banc
panel, to affirm in its entirety the three-judge decision in the Uno-
cal case. This decision has special importance because the defen-
dant, Unocal, is a California corporation, and, therefor, may be the
first ATCA defendant ever to pay a judgment. Should the Ninth
Circuit fail, the task will be left to the Supreme Court of the
United States. Because standards of international law would be
easier to apply, and more damaging to potential wrongdoers,
ATCA should move away from the ambiguous and often empty
standards of domestic jurisprudence and into a realm of meaning-
220. Id. at 202-03.
221. Randall, supra note 1, at 476 ("The literature . . . has often viewed the Alien
Tort Statute solely as a 'human rights statute,' without regard to the statute's more
basic origin, meaning, and usage.").
222. See generally Simon, supra note 6. See also Randall, supra note 1, at 511-38
(other suggestions on how to amend ATCA to make it more workable). For a further
discussion on how adoption of international standards can make a difference, see
Ridenour, supra note 9, at 603, and Forcese, supra note 166, at 510-15 (both sources
discussing how the result in Unocal would have been different had the Court applied
more appropriate standards of law under an ATCA analysis).
547
548 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3
ful legal doctrine. Even though adopting specific international
standards might prove difficult, and might at first seemingly exac-
erbate that which it is trying to remedy, the long term benefits of
legal solidarity and integrity would be well worth the time
invested in making the change. In addition, the original intent of
28 U.S.C. § 1350 would come back as a reality rather than as
empty words used as part of legal rhetoric.
But the effectiveness of adopting a new standard will be
directly proportional to the amount of effort accorded to develop-
ing its workability.223 The courts are not the only players involved
when it comes to defining a more workable scope of ATCA. Law-
yers and legal scholars are in positions to make a serious impact
as well.224 We need to acknowledge ATCA's limitations in
whatever form it is interpreted;225 until we do, new ways of adjudi-
cating international abuses and violations will go untested and
unacknowledged, and victims and their families will inevitably be
denied the complete justice they deserve. 26 Even by adopting the
simplest and least result oriented international standards, the
legal community would be taking a step in the right direction.
JUSTIN PROCIV*
223. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Senior Circuit Judge Robb noted "Given
the broad and novel questions raised by cases involving the Alien Tort Statute, courts
ought not to appeal for guidance to the Supreme Court, but should instead look to
Congress and the President. Should these branches of the Government decide that
questions of this sort are proper subjects for judicial inquiry, they can then provide
the courts with the guidelines by which such inquiries should proceed." Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 827 (C.A.D.C. 1984).
224. "[IUn practice, the reliance on human rights scholars as experts has led to the
development in the United States of a coherent, measured body of international law
norms." Stephens, supra note 121, at 488.
225. "The road to building a theory of corporate responsibility that does not simply
ignore decades of practice and doctrine about state and individual responsibility is to
recognize explicitly where decision makers could apply such principles to corporations
and where they could not." Ratner, supra note 152, at 496.
226. Simon, supra note 6, at 79.
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